POLAND KEEPS COOL A Trend To French Friendship

From Our Central European Correspondent As the German situation deteriorates and tension grows in Central Europe, the eyes of the world become more and more focussed upon Poland, upon the diplomacy and policy of which so much must depend.
Recent events prove that much has changed in Poland since the conclusion of the treaty of non-aggression with Germany in 1933. Undoubtedly there were many Poles who hoped at that time that the conclusion of that treaty would mean real friendship and peace with Germany, coupled with respect of Polish rights in Danzig and a cessation of Nazi irredentist intrigues in Polish Silesia. And there is no doubt but that, had German aims and policy been different, this treaty could easily have been the basis of a lasting peace in Central Europe. If such has not proved the case, it is certainly not Poland's fault.
The Fight Against Bolshevism
Of late there have been a number of factors which are bringing Polish policy steadily back to the traditional French friendship which, whether justifiably or not, suffered somewhat at the time of the signing of the treaty with Germany. And one important factor is the attitude towards Bolshevism.
No nation has a better right to pursue a militant anti-Bolshevist policy than Catholic Poland, with its well-grounded fear of Russian nationalism. Indeed, nations that have had experience of the Russian yoke see remarkably little difference either in foreign policy or in nationalist outlook between pre-war Tsarist Russia and Bolshevist Russia.
Poland has seen the Russian Bolshevist armies fighting on its own soil. Poland has large areas, particularly in Eastern Poland, where poverty is extremely bitter and the population often a ripe prey for Bolshevist propaganda. There is a large Jewish population, many of whom look towards Russia. And there is always the dangerous, mystic• attraction of " the big neighbour."
But despite these problems Poland has invariably adopted an attitude of common sense combined with realism towards Russia. Polish statesmen have always avoided the pursuance of a policy of enmity towards the eastern neighbour with which, Soviet or not, Poland must perforce live—and Poland prefers good relations to had. Anti-communism in Warsaw does not mean anti-Russian hysteria, as in Berlin—and that is the fundamental difference between German and Polish foreign policy.
Communism stands condemned as an implacable foe to Christianity and European civilisation. But that does not mean that Communism is the only foe of Christianity and European civilisation. Still less does it mean that Communism is the root of all evils, and can conveniently be used as a cloak wherewith to disguise other shortcomings.
Nazism Suspect
There is in Poland an uneasy feeling that the Nazi crusade against Communism is not inspired by love of Christianity or European civilisation. Nazi policy and philosophy are clear enough indications of that. And, as a leading Viennese paper drily remarked, there still remain quite a number of Christians and Europeans who wonder in their innocence what help they are likely to get in the long run from such original allies as Shintoism and the German heathens, headed by good friends of Christianity like Herr Rosenberg, or from institutions such as hara-kiri or forcible sterilisation . . . .
The crusade, it is being realised more and more in Poland, is no more than a useful weapon for German expansionist aims. Wild allegations in the Berlin press, ruch as the recent assertion that Southern France is already a full-fledged Soviet State, prove that it is simply another and more original way of whipping up national feeling, and as such might one day be of great potential danger to Poland.
Only recently a mass trial in Polish Silesia revealed that there was a secret Nazi organisation working for a revolt against Poland. Events in Danzig, too, show that there likewise there is a wide divergence between German and Polish aims. And the stupendous scale of German rearmament, coupled with the mushroom growth of aerodromes in the neighbourhood of the Polish frontier, has given much food for thought.
Motive for Manifestations
All these elements account for such manifestations as the cordial visits paid to France by Marshal Srnigly-Rydz and to Poland by General Gamelin, the economic agreement and the French loan, much of which will be in the form of armaments. Ratifying the latter in the Sejm, Colonel Beck took the opportunity of reminding the country that the Franco-Polish alliance of 1921 still held good, whatever other negotiations might be entered into (a reference to the Franco-Soviet pact and the future Western pact negotiations).
This statement was received with marked disfavour in Berlin, and an order prohibiting all aircraft other than German military machines to fly over an area of some 2,000 square miles along the Polish frontier was issued the next day by the German Government, presumably as a sign of hostility.
The importance of Poland's new attitude, particularly if followed up, is hard to exaggerate. A leading Austrian military authority informed me a few days ago that he and many of his colleagues considered the Polish army actually superior in efficiency to the Russian army.
A Factor for Peace
Allowing for differences of opinion, it is quite certain that Poland, near to Berlin and the Silesian industrial area, with its first-class military machine and 34,000,000 inhabitants, is not only a great European power, but a most desirable ally and—better still—a potent factor for peace.
No country desires peace more or has shown greater zeal for peace than Poland, but not at the price of complicity in German schemes. Certainly her realism and her desire to keep aloof from the quarrel between her great neighbours are a ray of sunshine in a gloomy sky.