Poland and Russia

ACERTAIN amount of time has now elapsed since the Soviet " suspended " relations between herself and Poland. We have already said that we regard this break as a calamity which can bring no profit to anyone but the common enemy. Anything said or done that could widen the breach would be an ill-service indeed to the Allied cause, and it is to be noted that Poland has been most careful to avoid any act or gesture that coutd make matters worse. And though apparently differing voices speak from Russia, Stalin himself has openly repudiated the idea that Russia intends to " liquidate " Poland; he asks instead for a free and independent Poland with which a military alliance could be made to the interest of both sides.
Though the dispute arose from the past—and an impartial observer cannot but recognise the well-founded grounds of Polish grievances—it is right that the main emphasis shall be placed rather on the future. This is a point the general observation of which would greatly ease all international relations which are too easily regarded as bonds tying the world to conditions that have changed rather than as reins which can guide us forward. In this case the crux of the problem is obviously the future position of Russia vis-a-vis her Western neighbours, and this question links up in turn very directly with the future European intarnational order.
The Claims Examined
Russia's claims on Eastern Poland and the Baltic States are partly historical and racial and partly economic and strategic. If we dismiss, as we surely must, unless we take too seriously the irresponsible words of some of Stalin's followers inside and outside Russia, any suggestions that these claims are but the first step in a policy of imperialistic aggression, comparable with that of Hitler, we are entitled to study the claims and counter-claims on the basis of the best interests of the two parties chiefly concerned and of Europe as a whole.
In this light the historical qUestion assumes a comparatively
minor importance. Surely it is time that all nations—and especially strong and great nations— transcended the sub-adult stage of history when present and future claims were based upon endlessly controverted historical questions. What matters to the intelligent nation is not the story of frontier changes in the more or less remote past, but the formulating of relations that can be worked in the future and that can give promise of common peace and prosperity. The racial question, too, can be exaggerated to an absurd and dangerous degree, as Germany h:-.. demonstrated. Nothing is easier than to whip up racial feelings' by astute propaganda, but nothing is more mischievous and more obviously the instrument of imperialistic power politics. This is especially true of the kind of districts at present in dispute, districts largely inhabited by peasant people who themselves have but the smallest consciousness of abstractions like race and, nation and ideology. Such peasants, whether in the East or South of Europe, have but one main concern, and that is the right of each of them to live—a right which in most cases resolves itself in the right to hold their little property
in security ut?der just laws. A deep religious feeling gives a sufficient spiritual meaning to their
lives, and if their happiness is sought their simple life and their simple religion must be the first concern of their rulers.
There remain the economic and strategic issues. In many cases these do present genuine cases of conflict that often seem insoluble except in terms of wiser international systems. But, as it happens, in the case in point there is very little economic or strategical value to be derived for anyone from the poor and indefensible regions that for the most part Make up Eastern Poland.
All this suggests that with a little intelligence and a little goodwill the present dispute can be solved to the satisfaction of both sides.
The Alliance
What then would a statesmanlike approach to the question suggest?
We are presuming that Germany will be defeated. Such measures will be taken—whatever they may prove in detail to be— as to make it less likely that Germany will continue to be a perpetual threat to world peace. If this is the case, Russia will have no need to fear an early or an important German aggression against itseaf. To the South, Russia has nothing to fear. To the East, there are difficulties, for Russia may well take the view that the far-Eastern nations. with their immense populations and their great potential wealth, added to the fact that geographical distances make it harder to include them in workable international systems, must always remain a potential threat.
Such being the facts, it seems evident that a strong, free and independent Poland, her culture based on her own traditions and religion and free from grievance, must be wholly to Soviet Russia's advantage. Poland, we may be sure, is only too ready to welcome a military alliance with her powerful neighbour on such terms.
In so far as Germany with her large population and great energy remains a permanent threat, whatever measures he taken to hold her at bay, a strong and independent Poland, relatively well-armed, would receive the first German assault and give to Soviet Russia needed time to mobilise her defences. And though the help which Poland could offer against a far-Eastern aggression would be far less important, the alliance of a strong Power of some forty million souls which could guard Russia's Western frontiers would not be a thing to despise.
The Wider Results
Nor need we confine our vision to an otherwise isolated Poland. One of the best proposals put forward since the war was the idea of a federation between the smaller European States in the East and South of Europe. To consider such a federation as potentially hostile to Russia. besides being militarily absurd, is tantamount to a declaration that Russia has designs on Europe. Therefore we must conclude that such a federation, bound also by the proposed alliance, could be nothing but an added security to a peaceful Russia as against any form of anti-Russian aggression on the part of Powers sufficiently strong to make this a practical
proposition. .
Thus we get in the East of Europe a perfectly natural development of international engagements that respect the proper sovereignty of all concerned, that form a common defen.sive system and that would give hope of better economic and cultural understandings, more especially if the group were related to other groups in wider associations for the maintenance of peace and the better ordering of economic relations.
Frankly, we find it hard to see what comparable advantages, even on the purely utilitarian plane, are to accrue to the strongest Power concerned by its gaining possession of the intrinsically unimportant districts in dispute Or even the smaller Baltic Powers. Any such action would leave in its trail a legacy of hatred and disorder, imperilling all future settlement, it would weaken the friendship and trust of other European nations and it would put Russia face to face with a Germany which cannot be destroyed, as Stalin, of all the Allied leaders, best realises.