A POLITICAL vacuum exists in Northern Ireland. It is in

part a concomitant of direct rule. Direct rule does not positively facilitate the
restoration of normal
political processes.
Indeed, direct rule, which was originally introduced as a temporary holding operation, intended to speed movement towards a political solution, has now negative effects in respect of such movement.
There must be a new political initiative. This must come from Britain. It can come only from Britain. These are controversial claims.
Coming from an Irishman, they might be thought to reflect inherited prejudices. I shall state my grounds for holding that they are both unprejudiced and true.
Direct rule has political anomalies and even constitutional absurdities of which few are aware. Northern Ireland is now ruled by a nonindigenous administration, none of whose members ever had a vote cast for them in the
area they govern.
Difficult
It is difficult for them to acquire knowledge of the psychology, history, traditions and cultures of Ulster, or to develop empathy with local feelings. This is no criticism of dedicated people who are doing their best. It is merely the facts of the situation.
Direct rule could be acceptable as an emergency measure of short duration, while political discussions were proceeding. Its indefinite prolongation in a political vacuum can only create what a Presbyterian Church document in 1972 called "a sense of pain and loss of confidence" among the people.
This is a people which had already experienced 50 years' of largely autonomous regional government. The Stormont regime had grave inherent effects and injustices. These resulted in its total failure to win the consensus of the minority community.
Successes
But it must be recognised that this regime also had considerable successes and impressive achievements. To dismiss it merely as "50 years of Stormont misrule" is unfair. In the field of industrial development, education, health, social welfare, roads and communication, Northern Ireland has a proud record.
Tolerance and inter community contacts were beginning to grow in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was tragic that the Stormont Administration misunderstood the true nature of the civil rights movement; that this movement's demands for justice were misinterpreted as subversive, and that they were met by sectarian intransigence from loyalist extremists. Nevertheless, the people have proved themselves capable of government. It is humiliating for them now to be represented as incapable of even participating in government.
Powerlessness
The current official line seems to be that the Northern Ireland political partits must "come together and work out a solution for themselves."
But it must be observed that in Northern Ireland they have no assembly for political debate, no Parliamentary Press Service to report their views to the public, and strictly no more rights than any citizen to initiate apublic discussion.
The former elected representatives in the outgoing Assembly and Convention have, in the present situation, no status other than that of ordinary citizen. It sounds incredible, but it is fact, that they have no official access to the Northern Ireland Office and no right to official information. Like any ordinary citizen they learn of decisions from the media. Like any man in the street they are left to infer or guess at official policy from events.
How could politicians in such a situation avoid a sense of futility and hopelessness? How can political debate in Northern Ireland be other than unreal and irrelevant? In such a situation, extremist obstructionism is more important than political debate. Effective initiative passes into the hands of the paramilitaries. Insofar as these are consequences of direct rule, then direct rule is a recipe of alienation.
In other words, the mood of alienation and exclusion which long characterised the minority community now risks being transmitted to the majority community too.
For example, without elected representatives, how can the Northern Ireland community make their voices heard on issues so profoundly affecting their future, as those raised by the Cowan Report on the Reorganisation of Secondary Education.
A healthy democracy demands participation of the governed. This is excluded by the present pattern of direct rule. The Northern Ireland Office is not accountable to the people whom it governs since that people have no sort of representative assembly.
The office does not have to define or defend its policy decisions to those affected by them. Some sort of substitute or accountability to a questioning Parliament could be provided by accountability to questioning journalists. But it is held by many that the degree of openness evinced even here leaves much to be desired.
It will scarcely be seriously claimed that sufficient accountability is provided by the infrequent questioning and token Northern Ireland debate at Westminster.
The degree of information, understanding or interest in
Northern Irish affairs common in Westminster debates is, putting it mildly, not likely to dispel the sense of alienation and hopelessness. The corresponding debates at party conferences in Britain often engender something worse than
hopelessness namely, a sense of resentment,
Sovereign
Yet, Westminster is the Sovereign Government. The Government's paper, "The Future of Northern Ireland" in 1972 (a paper which, I believe, was a landmark in British understanding and analysis of the Irish problem) has the words: "The United Kingdom Parliament must be the sovereign authority over all persons, matters and things in Ireland." Not only is the British Government the ultimate authority: it is in political terms the sole authority in Northern Ireland at this time. It would be disingenuous to pretend that the problem is an Irish one and the Irish must "settle it themselves."
Even if — and this is a very large if — one were to leave history and even moral obligations out of it, one cannot ignore the constitutional fact and the political reality. There is no constitutional machinery, there are no instruments, no institutions available to northern Ireland parties at this time for working out solutions,
The British Government is conspicuously not leaving the Scottish parties to work out formulae for devolved government in Scotland. Yet, under the existing constitutions and in the present political systems, Northern Ireland is as wholly and solely Britain's responsibility as is Scotland.
Impotence
Britain is not leaving the two Rhodesian communities to "work out their own solutions". Yet, Northern Ireland is much more directly Britain's historic, political and moral responsibility as is Rhodesia.
Surely, Britain cannot with self-respect, with honour or with credibility among the nations, admit to political impotence and cluelessness at her own back door.
British readers may under standably ask, in genuine bafflement and frustration, if not with irritation: "But what or can Britain do?" It would be fair, but would be judged facile, to retort: "Do what governments exist to do. Assume the responsibilities of governing."
It will be more constructive to point out that Britain has had wide and usually successful experience in coping with analagous problems of constitution making in overseas territories. Surely there are many models of constitutional conferences from which lessons can be derived.
Sunningdale
Still nearer the point would be an in-depth analysis of why Sunningdale and the Assembly and power-sharing executive failed. There was, undoubtedly, exaggerated Sunningdale euphoria. There was unhelpful Sunningdale triumphalism.
But I am convinced that there has also been unjustified post-Sunningdale pessimism. The failure was arguably due to factors which were avoidable and need not be recurring accidents, mistiming (especially that of the United Kingdom elections), .misinterpretation, over and under reaction, lack of governmental leadership perhaps more than to active Unionist rejection of the powersharing principles,
Sunningdale and the later Convention were something to learn from, to go forward from, not to despair of: above all, not to make a reason for opting out,
If much of the present malaise lies, and I believe it does, in the lack of seriousness in Northern Irish political discussion and the lack of official status by Northern Irish politicians, surely some new form of elective permanent constitutional conference chaired and convened by Britain, could be tried.
Minimum
It could have been an openended mandate in terms of duration, to resolve any sense of threat or ultimatum by deadlines. It need have only the broadest of parameters, but they must be clearly defined and approved by Britain, the sovereign authority. Minimum conditions would surely be that any solution to be viable or to be accepted by Britain would have to recognise the bi-cultural community character of the population and embody elements capable of rallying the consensus of the majority in both communities. This is obviously to stray beyond my competence as pastor and moral teacher. I make these points only because I could otherwise be accused of evading an obvious objection that there is nothing Britain can now do.
What is within my competence is to say that I believe that the present policy vacuum and political inaction are morally intolerable, No one can guarantee the success of any new initiative.
What is unpardonable is not to keep on actively trying. It is because the British Govern ment does not at this time give positive indication that it is even trying that I believe it is failing its moral responsibility.
Security
I have severely criticised British security policy and practices. I emphatically deny any suggestion that I am thereby equating force used for subversion with force used by legitimate authority in accordance with the law for the preservation of public institutions and public order.
I do not contest the legitimacy and necessity of security operations. I contest the effectiveness of current security operations to achieve their stated end.
I criticise their all-toofrequent disaccord with normal respect for the personal dignity of innocent people and with the presumption that people are innocent until proved guilty. I contend that many of the methods used are not securing respect for public institutions and for public order.
Armies are just not suited to civilian peace-keeping operations. Surely military thinking has a very restricted relevance to civilian subversion. Security in this situation has much to do with a battle for minds, for credibility and for confidence, as with military successes.
Rough
From these aspects, present army policies must be pronounced counterproductive.
Methods of interrogation are too often unjustifiably rough, sometimes even brutal; the middle-of-the-night searches too frequent, too destructive, too often based on mistaken identity; the language and the gestures of army personnel too often obscene and insulting, the signs of what can only be described as a "Paddy-bashing" mentality are too frequent for one to remain silent about them.
What I am saying is not antiBritish prejudice. it is not said in anger: it is said in great sadness, It is said with regret and with searching of conscience, for one is fully aware of the danger of being misunderstood, of giving comfort to the IRA.
But what I have said is said with moral concern, for by such methods security forces do not eliminate men of violence: they begin to resemble them. They do not crush violence; they spread it. Such methods are providing a constantly-renewed source of recruitment for the IRA.
Nervous
The soldiers serving in Northern Ireland are not to blame for all this, They are often poor, bewildered, nervous youngsters, asked to do a desperately dangerous and frankly impossible task.
War is an ugly and brutalising business. Urban guerrilla war is perhaps even more ugly and brutalising than "conventional" war. It brutalises subversives,