The WE Week by Week

I THE JAPANESE I 1 WAR 1
By Copt Bernard Acworth
THIS week I will confine my few comments to the war against
Japan which is too often represented as being further on the road to a satisfactory conclusion than, in my view, is really the case.
Though the new Burma campaign is. no doubt, intended in due course to be co-ordinated with the sea-air-land operations in the south-west Pacific, at present they are completely separate. On the Burma campaign, in its present critical stage, I will only say this. The Japanese forces in Assam, and General StilWell'S American-Chinese forces in North'Burma, are mutually threatening one another's communications. The airborne jungle force 150 miles to the rear is dependent upon precarious aircommtuncations. We must hope that events in the near future will justify the optimism arid confidence of Headquarters in Delhi because another serious reverse in Burma would be likely to have unhappy political repercussmitlyns emonoseekire eIrceiosus. even than the For a tong time past the news from the south-west Pacific has been of seemingly almost unopposed bombings and bombaidments of Japanese-held islands, atolls and naval bases. Little has been heard of the land operations in New Britain, New Guinea and the Solo05005. It has been Claimed that 100,000 Japanese have been isolated, and are doomed, in these island outposts. It is clear that the American fleet is strong in these waters, but its chief need is naval bases nearer to Japan, and at present as far as can be detected from rather obscure communiques, no new bases suitable for a fleet have been won. -The 100,030 " isolated " Japanese soldiem seem, therefore, to be the obstacle to successful occupation of such bases. It is true that these American combined operations are " containing" large Japanese forces and sinking merchant Ape, but equally these outposts are " containing " even larger American resources. Who is most successfully containing whom ? The refusal of the main Japanese fleet to engage Admiral Nimitz is not necessarily a sign of weakness so much as an indication that bombings and naval bombardments are less effective than is generally believed.
Neither should the serious depletion of Japan's merchant marine be too confidently assumed. In the China Seas thousands of picturesque unconvoyed wooden junks with wooden sails are solving Japan's needs as well as hundreds of convoyed steel merchant ships arc serving ours elsewhere. The strategical key to the East lies, not in the Pacific islands, but in the South China Sea.