SPAIN AND KENNEDY

Restoring
image of
stability
BY FRANCISCO JAVIER DE LIZARZA
STRIKES in Spain are in the news again, and there are are those who see a possible connection between strike action and the future of Spanish relations with the United States.
The U.S.-Spanish Agreement of September 26, 1953, is due to expire in September of next year. Under its provisions, the U.S. has constructed four large air bases in Spain, as well as a naval base at Rota (not far from Gibraltar), considered to be one of. the finest bases operated by the American Navy in a foreign territory.
With all this, plus a further network of 17 installations, the U.S. has assured itself of a position for launching a major attack-independently of NATO.
The problem now is whether the agreement will be renewed or not. It seems certain that the military interests of the Pentagon will prevail over the political interests of the Kennedy administration, which has been less favourable towards Spain, in spite of Kennedy's Catholicism. A polite, but determined and intense, struggle of major importance is taking place between the two elements to resolve this question.
A perfectly reasonable hypothesis. held by some, suggests that the major strikes in Asturias and Vizcaya, in the early summer. followed a pattern for the creation of a state of anxiety which might have an unfavourable influence upon the Kennedy administration when re-negotiating the agreement
with Spain. Those strikes, prompted by a variety of causes and sources, were supported by the Leftist ana Communist parties.
It is evident that the strikes did little good to General Franco, not because he lacked the popular support to quell them. but because they occurred just when he wanted to present his country to the Americans as a compactly united nation under his leadership.
He was ultimately able to settle the strikes (strangely peaceful ones for a temperament as violent as the Spanish) but he has not resolved, at least in a definite way. the questions of the continuation of his regime. And this must and will be taken into consideration by the American diplomatic planners.
The son
BY an almost unanimous referendum of the Spanish people in 1947, General Franco established the Monarchy as the legitimate fulfilment of his regime. In so doing, he momentarily pacified the strong forces of the Spanish monarchists. traditional and/or liberal, and inexplicably closed off future manoeuvres on the part of republican or dictatorial claimants to the succession.
Thus. he can no longer suggest a republic with a president at its head. a regime which would he most favourably looked upon by many sectors of the Falange. He must bring back the monarchy if he intends to be consistent with his previous policy. The question revolves around the future monarch's acceptance or certain conditions imposed upon him by General Franco, Actually, there seems no doubt that the Monarch will be Juan de Bourbon. Javier Bourbon-Parma has many followers in Northern Spain, but to date none of his supporter have succeeded in becoming nationally well-known.
Don Juan has become convinced of the strength of his position and knowing that time is on his side, has not accepted
Franco's conditions for a return to the monarchy. For some time, interesting exchange of notes and meetings has been going on between the Pardo and Estoril, an Interchange of ideas which will go down in history as unique in their way. II is more than well known that Franco and Don Juan do not understand one another, nor do they agree or sympathize with each other's views.
Franco saw a solution to the question of succession in the person of Don Juan's SOO, PTIOCe Juan Carlos (who has been educated in Spain under Franco's control) as future king on condition that his father renounced his rights to the throne.
Wedding
HOWEVER, Juan Carlos, an excellent young man, although of rather limited intelligence in the opinion of those who know him, did not know how to play his role. Nor did Don Juan realize the truth of a statement made by Franco on a certain occasion that "if the monarchy returns to Spain. it will be by my 'will and against the opinions of many generals".
He was referring to the double game played by General Mole with the Carlists, whose help, on the eve of the rebellion in 1936. he had asked for without the promise of favours in return. While the strikes placed Franco's regime in an embarrassing but not dangerous position. Don Juan was engaged in the affairs of his son's brilliant wedding in Athens to a non-catholic princess. Intimates of Franco have stated that the General made known to Don Juan the disadvantages of
this marriage, even though it was assured that the Greek princess would officially be converted to the Roman Catholic religion and that the Vatican had provided all manner 'of facilities to this effect. But neither Don Juan nor his son listened to the voice of reason and experieres-.
Since that time, relations between Franco and Don Juan have not bettered themselves. Madrid gossip has it that at a meeting between Franco and the newly wed young prince. the General pointed out to Juan Carlos that his father was and is being ill advised.
Franco thus found himself without the proper cards to Play For re-negutieling an extension of the agreement between the U.S. and Spain, for, logically, the Americans would insist on guarantees of a continuance of the regime before signing such an extension for another five or 10 years.
The labour problem. together with the problem of succession. placed Franco in a position that necessitated a decision, a change in his conception of tactics. These unfortunate problems were those which Gil Robles wished to exploit.
Head of the Christian Democratic party under the Republic, Gil Robles had been War Minister when Franco was Chiet of General Staff, a fact completely forgotten in Spain today to the point where many of Gil Robles' friends go along with Martin Attain, a partisan of the tendency to collaborate with the present regime.
Gil Robles thought that the time had come to return to active political life. Under pretext of the panEuropean gathering at Munich (attended also by exiled Spanish republicans) he attempted to bring together the two currents .of thought (republican and nationalist. exiles and victors) and again regain his position as a political leader.
Changes
THE Spanish Government, seeing clearly what was happening, acted rapidly. and succeeded in obtaining a mass public opinion against the exiles' return by merely bringing back to the public minds the horrors and disastrous consequences occasioned by the Civil War. All criticism was directed toward the person of Gil Robles in order to discredit any other possible rival.
Clearly, an excessive attack upon Gil Robles could have the consequences of alienating the support of many catholic quarters, subscribers to the newspaper "Ye", and those people influenced by the personalities and the activities of the Spanish Christian Deniucrats.
The necessity of readjustment and taking steps became evident to General Franco. Faced with possible future labour unrest, he needed the strength of the nation behind him; to confront the Avierican negotiators he needed a plan for the solution of his problems; and at the same time he could ill afford to lose the backing of the readers of "Ys".
In Madrid, the "agora" of Spain, the talk was of crises and changes. The most varied names were shuffled about. and a point was reached where an unknown could shout his own name to see whether the Pardo would take notice. Changes. in effect, were not long in coming, and Franco inaugurated an ample and significant modification to his cabinet.
First to go were three military men, two of whom are out-andout supporters of Don Juan, General Barroso and Admiral Abarzuza. The latter has been the Spanish Government's official representative at the wedding in Athens, and his dismissal showed Franco's desire to maintain a firm position towards those at Estoril.
The most significant effect obtained. however. was the creation of a vice-presidency of the government. a position which had never before existed, and the naming of the only "Captain General" of Spain's Army. Munoz Grandes (without doubt the man of most prestige within the Armed Forces of Spain) to this position.
The vice-presidency will substitute for the president "in cases of vacancy, absence or illness" (Spanish law of 10 July, I9(i2). This is to say that, should Franco not be here tomorrow, Munoz Grandes would automatically succeed .him.
Not to be overlooked however. is the fact that the substitution of Munoz Grandes for Franco (and here is another proof of 'Franco's political astuteness) refers only to his position as head of the government. not as Chief of State. It would he as if the English were to designate MacMillan's successor, which would have nothing to do with the succession to Queen Elizabeth.
With this appoinment, Franco has assured the continuance of his regime. closing the door to other members of the military backing the candidacy of the intelligent Madrid General, Garcia Valino. At the same time, he has answered the perennial question from Estoril: "what will happen when the General dies?"
He has still not broken away from his monarchist commitment, nor has he backed away from his monarchist convictions. The door remains open. The return of the
monarchy to Spain depends upon a political harmony which has yet to be established by Don Juan's counsellors. Alternatively other pretenders rally new forces to their cause and gain strength.
Sure touch
Tn his new cabinet, Franco real". iscd the importance of winning to his side the Christian Democrats, that political sector which Gil Robles tried to win over in the Munich gathering.
For the delicate post of Minister of Information and Tourism he chose Frage Iribarne, a magnificent organizer, member of the Falance. who considers himself a liberal, as well as Jimenez Quilez and Garcia Esisudero (both members of the Christian Democrats) for the posts of Director General of the Press and Director General of Films and Theatre.
With these appointments, Franco has won the Christian Democrats to his side, has triumphed over Gil Robles, and has blunted the tendency of the Christian Democrats to attack his regime on grounds of insufficient freedom of the press.
With his undeniable sureness of touch, Franco has given a sense of security to the Spanish people in assuring them that there is a successor to his regime who is supported by the army. With this step Franco has again taken the initiative, and now holds the proper cards to renegotiate with the Americans for the extension of the Spanish-U.S. agreement.
It is curious to note that, in all the foregoing events there was no intervention by the Carlists, supporters of the restoration of a monarchy without Don Juan or his descendants. Nor did the Opus Dei (who lost influence in the Ministry of Information) intervene.
Finally, not even the Falangist party (the petty official bureausrats and the stay-al-home members who pay lip service to the party) made any effort to influence in one way or another the resolution of the crisis. These are, nonetheless, latent forces which must be taken into account in future developments,